Pragmatism and Perfectionism in the Development of the Rule of Action in Criminal Law with a Focus on Judicial Practice

Abstract

The jurisprudential rule of action (qa'idat al-iqdam), which emphasizes an individual’s responsibility for knowingly undertaking an act to their own detriment, has traditionally been applied within the domain of civil liability. This article aims to extend the scope of this rule into criminal law by examining its capacities across three domains: substantive law, procedural law, and judicial practice. In the substantive domain, the influence of the rule of action on the reduction of criminalization (such as euthanasia), the redefinition of barriers to criminal responsibility (including self-defense and consent), and the mitigation of liability at the post-offense stage is analyzed. In the procedural domain, the relationship between this rule and institutions such as statutes of limitation, criminal precautionary measures, and sanctions associated with non-compliance with procedural deadlines is clarified. Finally, through the analysis of judicial decisions, it is demonstrated how Iranian judicial practice has developed or limited this rule through a delicate balance between two approaches: “pragmatism,” aimed at enhancing efficiency and combating fraud, and “perfectionism,” aimed at preserving fundamental values and protective rights. The findings indicate that the rule of action, as a rational legal principle, possesses significant potential for transforming the criminal justice system, promoting a more equitable distribution of responsibility, and enhancing procedural efficiency, provided that its development remains aligned with fundamental legal principles and public interests.