Examining and Explaining the Gap in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Between the Sovereignty Structure and the Government During the Period 1979–1981

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine and explain the gap in foreign policy between the governments of Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Banisadr and the sovereignty structure in the Iran. In this regard, the main research question is formulated as follows: What were the gaps between the sovereignty structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the governments of Bazargan and Banisadr in the domain of foreign policy? In response to this question, the article advances the hypothesis that the foreign policy of the Bazargan and Banisadr governments was grounded in preservation-oriented realism, in contrast to the sovereignty structure’s realistic idealism. Furthermore, the sovereignty’s offensive perspective aimed at transforming the global order stood in opposition to the defensive outlook and balance-of-power preservation pursued by the governments of Bazargan and Banisadr. In addition to the above, another major gap concerned the sovereignty’s support for the occupation of the United States embassy, as opposed to the diplomatic efforts of the Bazargan government and its fear of international isolation. Another point of disagreement was the sovereignty’s emphasis on the exportation of the revolution based on the universalism of Islam, contrasted with the opposition of the Bazargan and Banisadr governments grounded in the principle of non-intervention. Finally, tensions also emerged between Banisadr and the sovereignty structure regarding the management of the Iran–Iraq War. The present article employs content analysis and relies on constitutional documents, the perspectives of political leaders, and scholarly texts based on the theory of realistic idealism. The findings demonstrate that these gaps ultimately led to the dismissal of governments and directed Iran’s foreign policy toward an independent, ideological, and anti-hegemonic identity. The innovation of this article lies in its integration of international relations theories with Islamic revolutionary discourse and its comprehensive analysis of the structural tensions of that period. The findings emphasize that the confrontation between the “interests of the Islamic Ummah” and “national interests” transformed Iran into a revolutionary actor within the international system.