Misalignment of the Objectives of U.S. Allies in the Failure of the Syrian War, 2011–2024

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the reasons for the failure of the coalition comprising the United States and its allies in Syria from 2011 to 2024 by examining the relationship between the misalignment of objectives, divergence in security perceptions, and the failure of multilevel interventions. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of alliance formation, proxy warfare, and defensive realism, and relying on field data and credible international reports, the study demonstrates that the roots of the coalition’s failure lay not in a lack of hard power but rather in structural conflicts among the interests of key actors, particularly the United States, Türkiye, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union. This divergence led to the emergence of parallel arms-supply networks, weakened the cohesion of opposition forces, intensified competition among regional sponsors, and prevented the development of a shared vision for the postwar period. These factors ultimately created opportunities for Russia and Iran to expand their influence and for the Syrian government to restore its power. The findings indicate that, in proxy wars, the alignment of objectives and threat perceptions plays a more decisive role than military superiority, and that the absence of such alignment can lead even the most powerful coalitions to failure. As a theoretical implication, the study suggests that future research should pay particular attention to the role of decision-makers’ cognitive mapping in multilateral interventions and its impact on coalition cohesion, since latent cognitive divergences often shape the trajectory of intervention and the political outcomes of wars more profoundly than material constraints.