The Position of Quasi-Legal Institutions in the Iraqi Legal System

Abstract

The collapse of the centralized authoritarian structure in 2003 and the subsequent process of modern state-building in Iraq created a conducive environment for the emergence and reproduction of structures that are analyzed in the literature of public law and political sociology under the concept of “quasi-legal institutions” or hybrid mechanisms. These institutions encompass a broad spectrum of mechanisms, including customary and tribal dispute-resolution mechanisms, military organizations with hybrid identities, extraordinary security committees, and political arrangements based on sectarian power-sharing. They operate at the intersection of the formal authority of the state and informal norms. Employing an analytical-critical approach and drawing on the theory of legal pluralism, this article examines the textual and functional position of these institutions within Iraq’s constitutional framework and statutory legal system. The findings indicate that, although these arrangements have at certain times contributed to containing immediate security crises or resolving local disputes, their overlapping jurisdiction with judicial authorities, erosion of the state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force, and disruption of the principle of separation of powers constitute fundamental obstacles to the establishment of the rule of law and the consolidation of a coherent legal system.