Jurisprudential Analysis of the Protection of Privacy and the Limits of the Judge's Authority in Obtaining Evidence

Abstract

Protecting the privacy of individuals is among the important foundations of safeguarding human dignity in Islamic jurisprudence. On the other hand, a judge, in order to perform his judicial duty and ascertain the truth, needs to obtain and examine information and evidence in certain cases. Therefore, when obtaining evidence necessitates encroaching upon individuals' privacy, a conflict arises between the necessity of discovering the truth and the necessity of protecting individual rights, the delimitation of which requires jurisprudential analysis. The present research aims, through a descriptive-analytical method and by referring to jurisprudential sources and studies conducted on the subjects of tajassus (spying/intrusion), privacy, and obtaining evidence, to offer a solution for resolving this conflict. The findings of the research indicate that in Islamic jurisprudence, the principle is based on the protection of privacy and the prohibition of unjustified intrusion into the personal affairs of individuals, and the judge's duty to discover the truth alone does not constitute a license for unlimited interference in this privacy. However, in cases where obtaining evidence is of genuine necessity for judicial proceedings and it is not possible to obtain it through conventional and minimally intrusive methods, the principle of limited and targeted intervention can be examined by relying on the relevant jurisprudential rules and foundations. In such cases, necessity, the absence of an effective alternative, proportionality between the objective and the extent of intervention, observance of the minimum necessary intervention, the direct relevance of the action to the subject matter of the proceedings, and adherence to impartiality and judicial oversight are among the most important criteria for limiting the judge's authority. Furthermore, an examination of jurisprudential foundations indicates that discovering the truth cannot serve as a means to justify any method of obtaining information, and a distinction must be made between the judicial action of obtaining evidence itself and the probative effects of information obtained through a privacy-infringing measure. Accordingly, the conclusion of the research is that the judge's authority in obtaining evidence in cases of conflict with privacy is an exceptional and restricted authority, limited to the extent of necessity, and its exercise must be such that, while fulfilling the actual needs of the proceedings, it prevents unnecessary encroachment upon individuals' privacy and dignity. This approach can provide a foundation for establishing a balance among discovering the truth, judicial justice, and protecting individual rights in the litigation process.