<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ArticleSet>
  <Article>
    <Journal>
      <PublisherName></PublisherName>
      <JournalTitle>Journal of Historical Research, Law and Policy</JournalTitle>
      <Issn>3115-7505</Issn>
      <Volume>2</Volume>
      <Issue>Serial Number 8</Issue>
      <PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
        <Year>2024</Year>
        <Month>10</Month>
        <Day>01</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </Journal>
    <ArticleTitle>Legal Indicators of Overreach in Emergency Decrees: A Case Study of Three States</ArticleTitle>
    <VernacularTitle>Legal Indicators of Overreach in Emergency Decrees: A Case Study of Three States</VernacularTitle>
    <FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
    <LastPage>9</LastPage>
    <Language>EN</Language>
    <AuthorList>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
    </AuthorList>
    <PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
    <History>
      <PubDate PubStatus="received">
        <Year>2024</Year>
        <Month>08</Month>
        <Day>11</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </History>
    <Abstract>&lt;p&gt;This study aims to identify and analyze the legal indicators of overreach embedded in emergency decrees through the perspectives of legal professionals and civil society actors in Tehran. This research employed a qualitative case study design using semi-structured interviews with 29 purposively selected participants, including legal scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, and former public officials residing in Tehran. Data collection continued until theoretical saturation was achieved. All interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically using NVivo software, following open, axial, and selective coding procedures to extract recurrent patterns and build a grounded typology of legal overreach. Thematic analysis revealed three core categories of legal overreach: (1) Procedural Violations, including lack of legislative oversight, the use of vague legal language, and indefinite extensions of emergency powers; (2) Rights Erosion Mechanisms, encompassing suppression of dissent, discriminatory enforcement, mass surveillance, arbitrary detentions, and restrictions on freedom of movement and expression; and (3) Structural Democratic Backsliding, characterized by executive aggrandizement, weakening of institutional checks, shrinking civil society space, and manipulation of electoral processes. Participants emphasized how emergency powers were normalized and strategically deployed, often beyond their initial scope, in ways that undermined legal accountability and democratic safeguards. Emergency decrees, though intended for crisis governance, are frequently manipulated to entrench executive authority, bypass institutional checks, and erode civil liberties. The Iranian case reflects broader global patterns where emergency governance becomes a vehicle for legal and political overreach. Identifying these indicators is crucial for informing constitutional safeguards, institutional reforms, and civil society resistance against the normalization of states of exception.&lt;/p&gt;</Abstract>
    <ObjectList>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Emergency decrees</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">legal overreach</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">democratic backsliding</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">qualitative research</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Iran</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">human rights</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">emergency governance</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">civil liberties</Param>
      </Object>
    </ObjectList>
    <ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jhrlp.com/index.php/jhrlp/article/download/45/44</ArchiveCopySource>
  </Article>
</ArticleSet>
