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<ArticleSet>
  <Article>
    <Journal>
      <PublisherName></PublisherName>
      <JournalTitle>Journal of Historical Research, Law and Policy</JournalTitle>
      <Issn>3115-7505</Issn>
      <Volume>4</Volume>
      <Issue>Serial Number 13</Issue>
      <PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
        <Year>2026</Year>
        <Month>03</Month>
        <Day>01</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </Journal>
    <ArticleTitle>The Right of Access to Taxpayers’ Information in the Legal Systems of Iran and France</ArticleTitle>
    <VernacularTitle>The Right of Access to Taxpayers’ Information in the Legal Systems of Iran and France</VernacularTitle>
    <FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
    <LastPage>13</LastPage>
    <ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.61838/jhrlp.73</ELocationID>
    <Language>EN</Language>
    <AuthorList>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
    </AuthorList>
    <PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
    <History>
      <PubDate PubStatus="received">
        <Year>2025</Year>
        <Month>08</Month>
        <Day>28</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </History>
    <Abstract>&lt;p&gt;This article provides a comparative analysis of the right of access to taxpayers’ information and examines how a balance can be achieved between the state’s authority to access information and the taxpayers’ right to privacy in the legal systems of Iran and France. The findings of the study indicate that France, supported by a historically rooted and well-structured legal framework, has adopted a balanced approach. In France, although the tax administration enjoys broad powers to access information, such powers are restricted by strict principles such as the “principle of proportionality,” “respect for the right of defense,” “prior notification to the taxpayer,” and “judicial oversight.” These restrictions are reinforced by higher-level legal instruments such as the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and binding charters on taxpayers’ rights. In contrast, the Iranian legal system—largely based on ordinary legislation—grants the Tax Administration extensive and comprehensive powers to access taxpayers’ information but suffers from serious shortcomings in establishing robust legal safeguards and independent oversight mechanisms to protect taxpayers’ privacy. This imbalance is also evident in the structure of the tax dispute resolution system in both countries. In Iran, dispute resolution bodies such as the Tax Dispute Settlement Boards face challenges regarding their independence and impartiality due to their institutional dependence on the Tax Administration. Moreover, the multiplicity of appeal stages creates a lengthy and costly process for taxpayers. Consequently, the article recommends that Iran’s tax system, drawing inspiration from the French experience, should focus on strengthening independent supervisory institutions, enhancing procedural transparency, drafting clear and uncomplicated legislation, and, most importantly, establishing an independent, specialized, and efficient tax adjudication system. Such reforms would help achieve a sustainable balance between fiscal efficiency and the protection of taxpayers’ rights.&lt;/p&gt;</Abstract>
    <ObjectList>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Right of access to information</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">taxpayer</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Iranian legal system</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">France</Param>
      </Object>
    </ObjectList>
    <ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://jhrlp.com/index.php/jhrlp/article/download/73/102</ArchiveCopySource>
  </Article>
</ArticleSet>
