Possibility or Impossibility of Centralized Federalism as an Optimal Governance Model for Afghanistan

Abstract

Afghanistan has continuously been subject to conflict among various political actors and groups seeking to gain and consolidate power; to the extent that the modern political history of this country—from its establishment to the present—may be described as a history of prolonged political struggles over power acquisition. The prevalence of political conflicts and internal tensions throughout Afghanistan’s history reflects the presence of fundamental challenges in the sphere of governance. In this article, using a descriptive–analytical method, we seek to answer the question of what factors have caused such a high level of conflict and prevented the establishment of relative stability in Afghanistan, and what solutions may be proposed to address this issue. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed due to the imitation of Western governance models, a high degree of state centralization, the unjust distribution of power, the marginalization of groups and ethnic communities, the failure to utilize the capacities of local governments, and widespread corruption. Given the mosaic structure of Afghan society and the predominance of ethnic, tribal, and racial affiliations over national sentiments and loyalties, a model of federalism—one that grants relative autonomy to provinces while simultaneously maintaining a strong federal central government—may constitute an appropriate political solution for ending the country’s long-standing power struggles.