Iran’s Criminal–Judicial Policy Toward Financial Crimes Committed by Public Officials: A Comparative Study with Afghanistan

Abstract

Financial crimes committed by public officials, including embezzlement, bribery, abuse of official position, and misappropriation of public property, constitute some of the most serious challenges facing contemporary legal systems, as they cause severe damage to administrative integrity, public trust, and the legitimacy of governments. Effective control of such crimes requires the adoption of an efficient criminal policy operating in both legislative and judicial dimensions. The present study, employing a descriptive–analytical and comparative approach, examines the legislative–judicial criminal policies of Iran and Afghanistan in dealing with financial crimes committed by public officials and analyzes the existing challenges and deficiencies in both legal systems. The findings indicate that both countries apply a form of differentiated criminal policy in addressing financial crimes of public officials, manifested in measures such as the establishment of specialized judicial bodies, the aggravation of penalties, and the application of special procedural rules. However, Iran’s legislative criminal policy is affected by phenomena such as fragmentation of laws, over-criminalization, and the predominance of a punitive-oriented approach, which has led to reduced effectiveness of penal responses and neglect of preventive measures. In contrast, Afghanistan’s legislative criminal policy, despite efforts to achieve normative coherence through the Penal Code and specific anti-corruption statutes, suffers from limited practical effectiveness due to political instability, institutional weakness, and governmental immunity in certain domains. At the judicial level, both systems face common challenges, including weak institutional coordination, prolonged judicial proceedings, and susceptibility to political and administrative pressures; nevertheless, in Afghanistan these challenges are exacerbated by the lack of judicial expertise and the instability of judicial structures. The conclusion of the study demonstrates that mere intensification of penalties cannot constitute an effective solution to financial crimes committed by public officials, and that an optimal criminal policy requires an integrated approach grounded in prevention, transparency, judicial independence, and genuine protection of whistleblowers.