A Comparative Analysis of Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory and the Logic of Biopower

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61838/jhrlp.378

Keywords:

advanced biotechnology, balance of threat, perceived threat, biosecurity

Abstract

This study critically evaluates the framework of Walt’s balance of threat theory in relation to the emergence of advanced biotechnological systems, such as synthetic biology and genome editing. The central argument is that the structural characteristics of biological technologies, particularly their small scale, inherent concealability, and dual-use capacities, have shifted the balance of power in international security from an objective dimension based on material resources to a subjective and perceptual dimension. Technological developments have reinforced the structural gap between objective and perceived power and have significantly increased the analytical weight of the qualitative components of threat, namely “offensive capability” and “offensive intention.” Redefining Walt’s components within the biological context shows that “aggregate power” is now equivalent to the capacity for biological innovation, “proximity” has shifted from geographical proximity to technological proximity, and offensive capabilities and hostile intentions have become almost inseparable and difficult to identify. Consequently, biological threat is more of a processual construct based on uncertainty than a reaction to an observable material capability. This situation changes the equations of coalition formation and drives actors toward strategies of preemptive balancing. The comparative analysis shows that countries with infrastructural weaknesses in the field of biological monitoring and control, such as Iran, are more vulnerable to the intensification of perceived threat. Accordingly, the study proposes necessary strategies for reducing this perception, including strengthening biodefense, increasing controlled transparency, and enhancing scientific and biological literacy at the national level. Ultimately, biotechnology is presented as a new structural variable that can activate the balance of threat without necessarily requiring a change in material capability.

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How to Cite

Tahmasebi, F., Sanaei, A., Jalali, R., & Nourmohammadi, M. (2027). A Comparative Analysis of Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory and the Logic of Biopower. Journal of Historical Research, Law and Policy, 1-13. https://doi.org/10.61838/jhrlp.378

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