Jurisdiction, Functions, and Powers of International Criminal Courts

Abstract

International criminal courts, as one of the most significant manifestations of the realization of international criminal justice, were established in response to the inadequacy of national mechanisms in addressing serious international crimes. These institutions demonstrated their necessity particularly after the Second World War and in the wake of organized crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The establishment of ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and subsequently the creation of the International Criminal Court as the first permanent international criminal judicial body, marked a turning point in the gradual development of international criminal law. In this article, using a descriptive–analytical approach, various dimensions of jurisdiction (including subject-matter, personal, territorial, and temporal jurisdiction), the principal functions of international criminal courts in prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of international crimes, and the judicial and executive powers of these courts are examined. Furthermore, through a structural comparison between ad hoc and permanent courts, their fundamental similarities and differences are analyzed. On the other hand, the challenges and obstacles facing these courts—including lack of state cooperation, politicization of judicial processes, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms, and limitations related to territorial and temporal jurisdiction—are discussed. The findings of the article indicate that despite the relative successes of these courts in prosecuting some perpetrators of egregious crimes, a long path remains toward the full realization of international criminal justice. Accordingly, revisiting legal mechanisms and strengthening state cooperation with these institutions appear to be necessary and undeniable requirements.