Legal Indicators of Overreach in Emergency Decrees: A Case Study of Three States

Authors

    Sina Farjam * Department of International Law, University of Qazvin, Qazvin, Iran Sina.Farjam1394@gmail.com

Keywords:

Emergency decrees, legal overreach, democratic backsliding, qualitative research, Iran, human rights, emergency governance, civil liberties

Abstract

This study aims to identify and analyze the legal indicators of overreach embedded in emergency decrees through the perspectives of legal professionals and civil society actors in Tehran. This research employed a qualitative case study design using semi-structured interviews with 29 purposively selected participants, including legal scholars, civil society advocates, journalists, and former public officials residing in Tehran. Data collection continued until theoretical saturation was achieved. All interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically using NVivo software, following open, axial, and selective coding procedures to extract recurrent patterns and build a grounded typology of legal overreach. Thematic analysis revealed three core categories of legal overreach: (1) Procedural Violations, including lack of legislative oversight, the use of vague legal language, and indefinite extensions of emergency powers; (2) Rights Erosion Mechanisms, encompassing suppression of dissent, discriminatory enforcement, mass surveillance, arbitrary detentions, and restrictions on freedom of movement and expression; and (3) Structural Democratic Backsliding, characterized by executive aggrandizement, weakening of institutional checks, shrinking civil society space, and manipulation of electoral processes. Participants emphasized how emergency powers were normalized and strategically deployed, often beyond their initial scope, in ways that undermined legal accountability and democratic safeguards. Emergency decrees, though intended for crisis governance, are frequently manipulated to entrench executive authority, bypass institutional checks, and erode civil liberties. The Iranian case reflects broader global patterns where emergency governance becomes a vehicle for legal and political overreach. Identifying these indicators is crucial for informing constitutional safeguards, institutional reforms, and civil society resistance against the normalization of states of exception.

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References

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Published

2024-10-01

Submitted

2024-08-11

Revised

2024-09-16

Accepted

2024-09-28

How to Cite

Farjam , S. (2024). Legal Indicators of Overreach in Emergency Decrees: A Case Study of Three States. Journal of Human Rights, Law, and Policy, 2(4), 1-9. https://jhrlp.com/index.php/jhrlp/article/view/45

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