Analysis of the Design–Implementation Gap in Public Anti-Corruption Policies in Afghanistan: Explaining Institutional, Structural, and Political Barriers during 2004–2021

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Keywords:

corruption, public policy, design–implementation gap, anti, corruption policies, governance, Afghanistan

Abstract

Corruption has been one of the most significant challenges to governance and the effectiveness of the administrative system in Afghanistan over the past two decades. Despite the enactment of laws and strategies, the establishment of specialized institutions, and the implementation of numerous anti-corruption programs, a substantial gap has persisted between the objectives envisaged in public policies and the outcomes achieved through their implementation. The present study aimed to analyze the design–implementation gap in public anti-corruption policies in Afghanistan and to explain the institutional, structural, and political barriers contributing to this gap during 2004–2021. In terms of purpose, the study was applied; in terms of nature, it adopted an analytical–critical orientation and employed a mixed-methods approach. Data were collected through the analysis of policy documents and records, semi-structured interviews with 20 experts, and the examination of secondary statistical data related to corruption and governance. Qualitative data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis and MAXQDA software, while quantitative data were examined using descriptive statistics and trend analysis. During the qualitative analysis process, 348 initial codes were extracted, which, following refinement and consolidation, were reduced to 86 concepts, 26 subcategories, 10 main categories, and ultimately five overarching dimensions. The findings indicated that the design–implementation gap was shaped by five dimensions: political factors, institutional and structural factors, legal and implementation-related factors, social and cultural factors, and the incompatibility of certain policies with the Afghan context. Instability of political support, interference by powerful actors, limited institutional independence and capacity, organizational overlap and duplication, weak coordination, incomplete or selective enforcement of laws, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, the influence of informal networks, and the insufficient alignment of certain policies with administrative capacity were among the most important barriers identified. Quantitative evidence further demonstrated that an increase in the number of laws, institutions, and formal anti-corruption measures was not necessarily accompanied by sustained improvements in corruption and governance indicators. Overall, the design–implementation gap in Afghanistan’s anti-corruption policies was found to be multilevel and systemic in nature, and narrowing this gap requires simultaneous attention to the quality of policy design, institutional capacity and independence, non-selective enforcement of the law, accountability, and the alignment of policies with the country’s political and administrative realities.

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Danishjo, W. ., Houshmandyar, N., & Dehgan, M. (2027). Analysis of the Design–Implementation Gap in Public Anti-Corruption Policies in Afghanistan: Explaining Institutional, Structural, and Political Barriers during 2004–2021. Journal of Historical Research, Law and Policy, 1-17. https://jhrlp.com/index.php/jhrlp/article/view/456

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